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According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs
to capture the pay-setting process and beneﬁt from events outside of their control—get paid for
luck. In this paper, I ﬁnd that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), together with the governance regulations subsequently
introduced by stock exchanges, affects CEO pay structure. In ﬁrms whose corporate boards were
originally less independent, and thus more affected by these provisions, CEO pay for performance
strengthened while pay for luck decreased after adopting SOX. In contrast, those ﬁrms that
exhibited strong board independence prior to SOX showed little evidence of pay for luck and little
change in pay for performance following the adoption of SOX. The results are consistent with the
rent-extraction hypothesis, and they are robust to alternative explanations such as asymmetric
benchmarks, oligopoly, and managerial talent.
JEL classiﬁcation: G38, J33, M52
Bank classiﬁcation: Labour markets
Résumé
Pour les tenants de la théorie de l’appropriation de la rente, la faiblesse des mécanismes de
gouvernance d’entreprise permet aux chefs de direction de contrôler le processus d’établissement
de leur rémunération et de proﬁter des retombées d’événements indépendants de leur volonté
(rétribution liée à la chance). L’auteure constate que l’indépendance prescrite par la loi Sarbanes-
Oxley de 2002 a, tout comme les règlements en matière de gouvernance édictés plus tard par les
bourses, modiﬁé la structure de rémunération des chefs de direction. Dans les entreprises où les
conseils d’administration ont été plus touchés par les dispositions du texte (parce qu’ils étaient au
départ moins indépendants qu’ailleurs), les primes de rendement des dirigeants ont augmenté et la
part de la rétribution attribuable à la chance a diminué à la suite de l’adoption de la loi Sarbanes-
Oxley. Dans le cas des entreprises où se trouvaient déjà en place des conseils d’administration
forts, par contre, peu de données ont conﬁrmé l’existence de ce type de rétribution et la loi
Sarbanes-Oxley n’a guère eu d’effets sur les primes versées. Ces résultats sont conformes à la
théorie de l’appropriation de la rente et restent les mêmes lorsqu’on examine d’autres hypothèses
d’explication telles que l’asymétrie conjoncturelle des émoluments, la présence d’une structure
oligopolistique et la qualité des dirigeants.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G38, J33, M52
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés du travail1 Introduction
Executive pay has recently been at the center of a heated debate in the United States
due to the 200% increase in average CEO compensation over the last two decades (Hall
and Liebman, 1998; Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005). Two potential explanations for this
increase include the greater use of managerial incentives, such as stock options, as well as
the large growth in stock market valuations over that period (Bebchuk and Grinestein,
2005; Conyon, 2006). While the typical compensation package includes stock options
in order to motivate the manager to increase shareholders' wealth, it is not clear how
managers should be compensated when a ¯rm's value increases as a result of general
stock market movements and not from managerial e®ort (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
The bull market during the 1990s thus brought about a potential con°ict of interest be-
tween managers and owners. Shareholders were concerned that managers were rewarded
for riding the bull market, rather than being compensated for their own actions. The
central question in this paper is whether CEOs are actually paid for their contribution
to maximizing the value of the ¯rm, or whether they are instead paid for \luck," i.e., for
events outside of their control.
Prior research o®ers two competing views as to whether CEOs are primarily paid
based on luck. In the ¯rst view, Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that powerful CEOs can
capture the pay-setting process in ¯rms with weak boards which fail to oppose managerial
opportunistic behavior. In such ¯rms, CEOs have been awarded excessive pay, ultimately,
undermining the interests of shareholders. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) ¯nd that
CEOs are paid for luck, de¯ned as pay for observable shocks in ¯rm performance beyond
the manager's control, such as movements in industry returns, oil prices, or exchange
rates. Most importantly, their study shows that strongly governed ¯rms, as de¯ned by
the presence of a large shareholder, pay their CEOs less for luck than do the more weakly
governed ¯rms.
In the second view, CEO pay is designed to respond to changes in industry return in
order to motivate managers to exert an optimal level of e®ort. Rajgopal et al. (2006)
document that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to industry-wide and market-wide
performances is systematically higher for talented CEOs who enjoy outside employment
2opportunities. Gopalan et al. (2007) also ¯nd that \pay for luck" is prevalent for talented
CEOs operating in industries that o®er greater strategic °exibility. According to these
studies, pay for luck arises from an optimal contract.
It is important, from a shareholder's perspective, to know whether CEOs are skim-
ming at the expense of shareholders (by being paid for luck), or whether they are instead
being optimally paid as a result of movements in industry performance. If CEOs are
paid for luck, compensation reform that aims to decrease this type of pay should be
demanded. However, if a CEO's pay contract serves as an incentive device consistent
with ¯rm value maximization, then the owner intervention is not needed.
To understand whether CEOs are paid for luck, I explore how changes in corporate
governance mechanisms a®ect this type of pay. In particular, the percentage of indepen-
dent directors is used as a proxy for the e±cacy of corporate governance. If a low fraction
of independent directors is associated with low pay for luck, then it can be inferred that
corporate governance mechanisms such as requiring a majority of independent directors,
might work to reduce pay for luck and could potentially increase pay for performance.
Consistent with the previous literature, I de¯ne pay for luck as the response of pay to
industry-wide movements, versus pay for performance, which is the response of pay to
changes in a ¯rm's own performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and
Milbourn, 2006). Finding evidence that CEO pay for luck is sensitive to changes in
board independence provides support for the skimming view. The association between
pay for luck and board structure, however, is determined endogenously by ¯rm and CEO
characteristics, which makes it di±cult to infer causality (Core et al., 1999; Grinstein
and Hribar, 2004). Powerful CEOs who manage to in°uence and control the board will
tend to appoint directors with whom they have an a±liation. In return, weak boards
comprised of inside directors are more likely to allow their CEOs to be paid for luck.
In order to analyze the underlying causality between board independence and pay
for luck, I use a recent regulatory change in the U.S. corporate governance as a \natural
experiment." Speci¯cally, I consider a change requiring that the listed ¯rms be composed
of a majority of independent directors. This legal requirement was imposed by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Together with the corporate governance amendments
3to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), the SOX act was aimed to restore
investor con¯dence and to enhance the auditing standards of U.S. public companies after
a wave of corporate scandals broke in 2000. This paper estimates the impact of these
exogenous shifts in board independence on CEO pay for luck and pay for performance.1
To test the e®ect of these 2002 legal reforms on CEO pay for luck and pay for per-
formance, I construct two groups of ¯rms based on the degree to which they comply
with the new rules. The group of compliant ¯rms, comprised of ¯rms with a majority
of independent directors prior to 2002, is expected to be less a®ected by SOX and stock
exchanges stipulations than ¯rms that were forced to change their boards' structure.2
The corporate governance rules of 2002 provide two sources of variation that I employ in
my empirical methodology. First, I compare changes in CEO pay for performance (and
pay for luck) before and after 2002, second, I compare the di®erence in CEO pay for
performance (and pay for luck) before and after 2002 in independent board ¯rms (more
compliant) to the di®erence in CEO pay for performance (and pay for luck) before and
after 2002 in independent board ¯rms (less compliant). The ¯rst level of change measures
the e®ect of SOX by using temporal identi¯cation, which fails to eliminate the e®ect of
potential shocks occurring contemporaneously with the passage of the law and corre-
lated with CEO pay. The second level of change, however, eliminates the e®ects of these
shocks because it is sensitive to a ¯rm's degree of exposure to the reform. Di®erence-in-
di®erences methodology is applied to the ExecuComp data set over the period 1998-2005
as well as the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) data set over the period
1998-2002. The results show that CEO pay for luck is present only in less compliant
\dependent-board ¯rms" before SOX, and consistent with improved governance, the ef-
1Throughout the paper a reference to SOX will also take into account NYSE and NASDAQ regulations
of 2002.
2SOX is a complex law consisting of new requirements for accounting ¯rms, ¯nancial analysts, cor-
porate o±cers, and corporate directors (See Section 2 for details.) In this paper, compliance level refers
only to the requirement that a board is comprised of a majority of independent directors. More specif-
ically, SOX mandates an independent audit committee, and stock exchanges requires that all member
¯rms appoint a majority of independent directors who will sit on the nomination, compensation, and
audit committees.
4fect disappears after 2002.3 Next, I ¯nd that a CEO's pay for performance, designed to
make managers act in the best interest of shareholders, increases in the dependent-board
¯rms after SOX and does not change for the rest of the ¯rms.
These results are supportive of the skimming view, which suggests that regulatory
interventions might help to resolve agency con°icts between CEOs and shareholders.
However, these results could also be consistent with three alternative explanations. First,
Garvey and Milbourn (2006) posit that a positive response of pay to changes in industry
returns might not capture pay for luck but instead pay for taking systematic risk within
an industry. To address this concern, I test whether the sensitivity of pay to industry
returns remains when the \luck" turns out to be bad luck. The results suggest that the
sensitivity is greater when industry returns are positive than when they are negative, but
only in the dependent-board ¯rms before SOX. The lack of such an asymmetry in the
sensitivity of pay for luck to positive industry return after SOX suggests that the reforms
have managed to diminish the impact of skimming by making mangers bear the e®ect of
negative industry returns.
Second, Gopalan et al. (2007) and Milbourn (2003) ¯nd that pay for luck is more
likely to be observed among talented CEOs who possess valuable human capital and who
operate in an industry that o®ers strategic °exibility de¯ned as the \choice of magnitude
of the ¯rm's exposure to sector or market factors." According to their model, this type
of pay is designed to motivate executives to adjust the ¯rm's risk exposure to sector
movements. In examining the impact of CEO talent on ¯rms with independent and
dependent boards, I have demonstrated that CEO talent is not as consistently rewarded
as an optimal contract design would predict. That is talent is rewarded only in dependent-
board ¯rms before SOX; however, it is not rewarded after SOX. Overall, the sensitivity
of the results to board structure and the time of passage of SOX lend support to the
argument that CEOs are paid for luck rather than for talent, and that the 2002 corporate
governance regulations manage to decrease this type of pay.
Third, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) postulate that strategic interaction among
3\Dependent-board" ¯rm is de¯ned as a ¯rm not reaching certain threshold of a percentage of inde-
pendent directors before the adoption of SOX. See Section 3 for details.
5¯rms may explain the presence of pay for luck. In less competitive industries, managers
might not be paid for industry movements in order to discourage them from competing
excessively with other ¯rms in the industry. According to this explanation, pay for
luck is expected to be lower in companies that operate in less competitive industries. I
¯nd empirical evidence of nondecreasing pay for luck as product market concentration
increases. In addition, the dependent-board ¯rms exhibited a larger decrease in pay for
luck than did the independent-board ¯rms. Hence, the presence of pay for luck does
not seem to be related to strategic interaction within sectors, which further supports the
skimming view that managers are indeed extracting rents.
This paper contributes to several strands of research on corporate governance and
CEO pay. First, I add to the literature on CEO pay and board structure by suggest-
ing a better strategy for identifying the relationship between CEO pay and the board
structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Becht et al. 2002). This paper circumvents the
simultaneity between CEO pay and board independence by examining the requirement
of maintaining a majority of independent directors imposed by SOX and stock exchange
amendments. In a related study, Wang (2005) ¯nds that chief ¯nancial o±cer (CFO)
pay for performance decreases in compliant independent-board ¯rms with high uncon-
trollable risk (i.e, risk that cannot be eliminated by maximum auditing) after SOX, while
it increases in less compliant dependent-board ¯rms and high controllable risk. Unlike
the study by Wang (2005), this paper focuses on the impact of SOX on CEO pay for luck
as opposed to CFO pay for performance. In addition, I ¯nd that CEO pay for perfor-
mance increases in less compliant dependent-board ¯rms after 2002, which compliments
the ¯nding of Wang (2005) that CFO pay for performance increases for the same type
of ¯rms. Further, my analysis builds on Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey
and Milbourn (2006) that investigate the pay for luck phenomenon outside of the context
of SOX.
I also contribute to the literature on CEO pay growth. Gabaix and Landier (2008)
show theoretically that the recent rise in CEO pay is an e±cient equilibrium response
to the increase in the market value of ¯rms rather than occurring as a result of agency
problems. The results obtained in this paper indirectly imply that CEO pay structures,
6associated with rent extraction, are a®ected by the 2002 legal reform, which, contrary to
the model proposed by Gabaix and Landier (2008) implies that agency problems might
still play a role in determining CEO pay.
Finally, the ¯ndings are relevant to the current debate regarding the impact of SOX,
and whether or not its enactment was a costly political overreaction (Coates, 2007). In
particular, the results should be of interest to: (i) company boards which have been
strengthened and have presumably abandoned the practice of granting pay packages
which provide the possibility for rent-extraction; (ii) regulators who have been criticized
for implementing costly regulation; and (iii) shareholders who want to make sure that
their return on investment is not expropriated by the managers of their companies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on SOX and discusses related research. Section 3 describes the data and pay
patterns. Section 4 discusses the identi¯cation strategy employed in the paper and the
empirical speci¯cation. Section 5 proceeds with the results. Section 6 reports the results
for alternative explanations of pay for luck. Section 7 presents several robustness tests.
Concluding remarks are o®ered in Section 8.
2 Background, Prior Literature and Hypothesis
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002 as an anti-fraud measure in the wake of
large accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, and Adelphia. In-
vestors lost billions of dollars when the share prices of the a®ected companies collapsed.
Concerns were also raised about the stability of the U.S. securities markets in the after-
math of the scandals. Initiated by the federal government, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
considered to be among the most extensive reforms a®ecting U.S. corporate governance
since the initial federal securities laws were adopted in 1933 and 1934. The Act con-
sists of eleven provisions, which include new requirements for accounting ¯rms, ¯nancial
analysts, corporate o±cers and corporate directors. SOX established the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee and regulate auditing. SOX also
7strengthened corporate governance.4 For example, the audit committee, which is the
committee that oversees the auditors of a ¯rm must be composed of only independent
directors, de¯ned as those who are: \not receiving, other than for service on the board,
any consulting, advisory, or other compensation fee from the issuer, and as not being an
a±liated person of the issuer of any of its subsidiaries." Each member of the audit com-
mittee must be ¯nancially literate, and must be an \audit committee ¯nancial expert."
If these conditions are not satis¯ed the company must disclose that it does not have such
a committee and explain why it does not.
Immediately following the passage of SOX in July 2002, the NYSE and NASDAQ
announced their own new governance requirements. According to these requirements,
the board of directors of each NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed ¯rm must have a majority of
independent directors, who must comply with an elaborate de¯nition of independence.
Furthermore, the compensation, nomination, and audit committees shall consist of only
independent directors.
Scholars and practitioners are debating whether the costs of implementing the 2002
reforms outweigh their bene¯ts.5 This legislation has forced ¯rms to spend signi¯cantly
more on internal controls. In return for these higher costs, investors will presumably
face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft and bene¯t from greater transparency
and accountability. Apart from these direct costs and bene¯ts, SOX might indirectly
a®ect certain stakeholders. Although the Act does not regulate CEO pay, agency theory
4Timely and accurate information for investors is ensured by drastically increasing the sanctions for
management \misconduct." SOX imposes a fourfold increase in the maximum prison term for criminal
fraud. In addition, if there is an accounting restatement as a result of misconduct, the Act requires CEOs
and CFOs to reimburse any incentive-based compensation, or pro¯ts from the sale of stock received 12
months after the misreporting (Section 304). Furthermore, executives are prohibited from selling stock
during the pension blackout period and are required to report sales or purchases of company stock within
two days, rather than the previous window of ten days, after the transaction (Section 306).
5Eldridge and Kealey (2005) document a signi¯cant increase in audit fees associated with internal
control systems between 2003 and 2004. In an event study, Zhang (2007) ¯nds negative cumulative
abnormal returns around SOX. This Act is also blamed for the increased incidence of delisting after
2002 and for the lost competitiveness of the NYSE compared to the London Stock Exchange. Halling
et al. (2006) suggest that the decline in cross-listing is due to the improved liquidity of foreign capital
markets rather than to SOX enactment. Comparing cross-listed foreign companies subject to SOX in the
U.S. to non-cross-listed foreign companies, and to cross-listed companies that are not subject to SOX,
Litvak (2007) shows that the market premium after the passage of SOX declined for more pro¯table,
riskier and smaller companies with a higher level of pre-SOX disclosure that were cross-listed in the U.S.
8suggests that improved monitoring through board independence will a®ect CEO pay for
performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
Even prior to the passage of SOX and the preceding scandals, the role of board
structure on CEO pay had been studied extensively. Hallock (1997) ¯nds that boards
with interlocking directors|directors of two companies who sit simultaneously on each
other's company boards|pay a higher wage to the CEO. Similarly, Core et al. (1999)
show that CEO wages are positively correlated with the presence of interlocking directors.
CEOs seem to be paid more when they are appointed as board chairmen and when the
percentage of a±liated directors is high. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) discover that a
powerful CEO, who is also chairman, manages to extract higher bonuses. All these
studies remain silent, however, on the potential endogeneity among ¯rm value, CEO pay
and board structure. Core et al. (1999) use ex-post performance to infer causality. Their
study investigates the consequences of excessive CEO compensation in ¯rms with weaker
governance and ¯nd a negative relationship with future performance.
An alternative approach to examining the impact of board structure on CEO pay is to
look at changes in board structure due to factors outside the ¯rm. For example, changes
in legislation associated with board requirements might be viewed as an exogenous source
of variation potentially explaining pay variation. In the current analysis, I use the SOX
requirement for board independence to examine changes in CEO pay structure.
Research examining SOX and CEO pay is closely related to my study.6 Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2003) reason that SOX might increase the risk of CEOs and CFOs of being
accused of \misconduct" when selling a large number of stock options. Henceforth,
executives will be more reluctant to cash in their equity holdings after the passage of
SOX. Furthermore, their portfolios will be less liquid and will shift managerial attention
from short- to long-term stock prices.
6The impact of law regulations on executive pay has received attention in the literature before SOX.
Hubbard and Palia (1995) ¯nd that CEOs in the banking industry earn more after U.S. banking deregu-
lation occured in the 1980s and exhibit a stronger pay-for-performance link. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(1998) consider state anti-takeover legislation. They suppose that weak takeover threat should raise pay
because the entrenched CEOs can \skim" more easily whatever pay they can. In other words, the lack
of takeover threats allow entrenched CEOs to increase their rents at the expense of shareholders. The
authors ¯nd that large shareholders, who are associated with strong governance, help in limiting the rise
in mean CEO pay after the passage of the law and also increase their pay-for-performance sensitivity.
9Cohen et al. (2004) examine the change in the structure of executive compensation
after the passage of SOX. Focusing on pre- and post-SOX comparisons, ¯rms are expected
to respond to the increased liability by lowering the incentive component of managerial
pay and by increasing the ¯xed component so that managers are insured against risks
beyond managerial control. The results based on the ExecuComp data con¯rm an in-
crease in ¯xed salary and a decrease in incentive-based compensation of CEOs after the
passage of the Act. The observed shift from more risky to less risky pay is interpreted
as a form of insurance against the imposed liability after SOX. Another ¯nding of the
paper is that CEOs choose less risky projects after SOX, which might negatively a®ect
shareholder returns because of forgone pro¯table projects. Cohen et al. (2004) rely on
time series identi¯cation of SOX, which makes it di±cult to isolate the e®ect of other
contemporaneous events related to the reform's passage.
Wang (2005) explores the e®ect of the Act on CFO pay in ¯rms with strong and weak
board oversight prior to the passage of SOX. According to Wang (2005), two factors
are expected to a®ect CFO pay. The ¯rst is increased risk of material misstatement
of unaudited ¯nancial reports in the absence of internal control procedures, and the
second factor is increased monitoring. According to standard agency theory, ¯rms with
a strong board of directors will respond to the increased risk with reduced incentive
pay. Firms with weak boards, however, will be a®ected by both a rise in risk and
improved monitoring. The direction of the change in pay is unclear, since it depends
on the proportion of uncontrollable risk, managerial risk aversion and the cost of e®ort.
Wang (2005) ¯nds that CFO incentive pay is reduced after SOX in ¯rms with independent
boards and a high proportion of uncontrollable risk. Furthermore, ¯rms with weak boards
before the Act and low uncontrollable risk increase CFO incentive compensation after
the reform.
My paper borrows from the methodology of Wang (2005) to identify groups of ¯rms
with di®erent level of pre-SOX exposure regarding board independence. Unlike Wang
(2005), I focus on CEO pay for luck. CEOs are a highly visible group, with their corporate
responsibility increasing after the 2002 legal reforms. CEOs have recently been accused
of being excessively paid, presumably because they have managed to largely determine
10their own pay. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that because option contracts lack explicit
relative performance valuation executives receive windfall gains as market value increases.
In general, an optimal CEO contract should not depend on luck because this practice
fails to realign the interests of CEOs and shareholders.
The passage of SOX act aims to strengthen corporate governance which potentially
may reduce pay for luck. Dependent-board ¯rms might be weak and dominated by en-
trenched CEOs who appoint their friends to the board and subsequently capture the
pay-setting process. These ¯rms are subject to stronger consequences of the reform than
better-governed ¯rms in terms of meeting the board independence requirement. Further-
more, the improved board oversight is expected to decrease the incidence of pay-for-luck
practices. The above argument leads to Hypotheses 1a and 1b:
Hypothesis 1a. All else being equal, CEO pay for luck decreases in less compliant
dependent-board ¯rms after the passage of the 2002 reforms.
Well-governed ¯rms are not expected to change their pay structure after SOX because
pay for luck was not part of their compensation package before the reform was imple-
mented. I summarize this prediction in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b. All else being equal, CEO pay for luck remains unchanged in more
compliant independent-board ¯rms after the passage of the 2002 reforms.
This paper derives predictions about the impact of SOX not only on CEO pay for
luck but also on CEO pay for performance. Agency theory suggests that board structure
and pay for performance are connected. The role of the board is to o®er a pay package
that would give managers incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders.7 Apart
from o®ering a contract, boards also monitor whether managers act in the owner's best
interests. Board monitoring, however, comes at a cost. The role of monitoring is to
7In this optimal contracting world, the board might use an alternative mechanism to realign the
interests of managers with these of owners. Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998) see the threat of a
takeover as another incentive scheme to motivate CEOs to perform better.
11transfer risk from the risk-averse managers to the risk-neutral owners and to reduce
information asymmetry, which will enable owners to tailor the managers' rewards more
closely to their actions rather than to ¯rm pro¯ts. Hence, the expected result of improved
monitoring should be a reduction in pay-for-performance costs relative to the situation
without monitoring (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Monitoring will happen only if the cost
of doing so is o®set by the additional payo® of economizing pay for performance.
The passage of SOX demands stronger monitoring through the rule for a majority
of independent directors. According to the principal-agent theory, improved monitoring
leads to lower levels of pay for performance at the margin, because strong boards can
instruct managers to take actions that maximize shareholders' value. If monitoring is
too costly, however, boards can motivate managers by using pay for performance mecha-
nisms. Stated di®erently, increased board oversight after SOX might increase or decrease
pay for performance depending on monitoring costs. The magnitude of pay for perfor-
mance changes due to the adoption of SOX is an empirical question, which is addressed
by testing the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. All else being equal, CEO pay for performance changes in less compli-
ant dependent-board ¯rms after the passage of the 2002 reforms.
Hypothesis 2b. All else being equal, CEO pay for performance remains unchanged in
more compliant independent-board ¯rms after the passage of the 2002 reforms.
3 Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Standard & Poor's (S&P) ExecuComp database provides information about the ¯ve
highest-paid executives available in proxy statements. Disclosure rules for U.S. executives
require details on salary, annual bonuses, option holdings, equity and option grants, and
CEO age and CEO tenure. The database covers ¯rms from the S&P 500, the S&P
MidCap 400, the S&P SmallCap 600 and other supplemental S&P indices.8 The IRRC
8Since the sample contains both LargeCap and SmallCap ¯rms, ex-post survivorship bias is less likely.
12data are of annual frequency and cover the directors of the S&P 500, S&P 400 MidCap
and S&P 600 SmallCap ¯rms for the period 1998 to 2005. The data provide details on
the structure and practices of the boards of directors and historical information for each
director, such as the committees to which they belong to, board a±liations, shares held
and total voting power.
The ExecuComp sample contains 2,350 ¯rms, or 14,592 ¯rm-years, for the period 1998
to 2005 (See Table 1). O±cers named as CEOs are de¯ned by the CEOANN ¯eld for
each year.9 In 1998, around 10% of the ¯rms in the ExecuComp data did not report on
their CEOs, while, in 2005, only 1% did not report. Before excluding these ¯rms from the
analysis, a sample selectivity analysis is made on the relationship between the incidence of
not reporting CEOs records and ¯rm characteristics. The results from a logit regression
analysis shows that none of the estimated set of parameters is statistically signi¯cant,
which insures against biases caused by systematic non-reporting.
The IRRC data cover 2,906 ¯rms, or 12,959 ¯rm-years, for the period 1998 to 2005.
The sample obtained after matching both data sets over the period 1998 to 2005 consists
of 1,722 executives named as CEOs and 10,812 ¯rm-years. I rely on a successful match
between the IRRC and ExecuComp data only if a ¯rm is present for at least two years
for the period 1998 to 2002 in the IRRC data. This restriction allows me to calculate the
yearly average of board independence. Under this condition, there are 217 ¯rms present
in the ExecuComp data but missing from the IRRC data. A sample selectivity analysis
explores whether the non-matched ¯rms, which are available in the ExecuComp sample
but missing from the IRRC data for the period 1998 to 2002, are randomly distributed
across ¯rms with di®erent characteristics. The results show that SmallCap ¯rms are
more likely to be missing in comparison to the LargeCap and MidCap ¯rms.
Two alternative measures of board independence are used. First, I construct ten
portfolios according to ¯rms' sales for the period 1998 to 2001 and de¯ne the median
percentage of independent directors in each portfolio as a threshold. Then, for each
9Chief operating o±cers (COOs) and Chief ¯nancial o±cers (CFOs) are retrieved from the ¯eld
TITLEANN. The group of COOs is considerably smaller in comparison to CEOs and CFOs. It is
possible that COOs are not ranked among the top highest-paid executives and/or they are not reported
in the data.
13portfolio I classify a ¯rm as belonging to the independent-board subsample if its percent
of independent directors is higher than the median percent of independent directors in the
relevant portfolio. Similarly, the sample of dependent-board ¯rms consists of ¯rms with
a lower percent of independent directors than the portfolio median. Second, I employ an
alternative measure that relies on the majority of independent directors (more than 50%
of all board members) .
Firm-level data are taken from the Compustat industrial annual database. The in-
dustry a±liation is based on the Standard Industrial Classi¯cation. The three largest
industry groups in the sample comprise Commercial Banks (SIC 6020, 4.5% of the sam-
ple), Prepackaged Software (SIC 7372, 4.19% of the sample) and Crude Petroleum and
Natural Gas (SIC 1311, 2% of the sample). Furthermore, after eliminating ¯rms with
missing data for either total pay or return and trimming the pay variable at the 1% level,
the analysis-ready sample consists of around 1,650 ¯rms and 10,000 CEO-¯rm-years.
Table 2 reports summary statistics. The upper panel of the table presents the full
sample of all matched ¯rms, the middle one details the unmatched sample, and the
bottom panel shows the mean di®erences between independent and dependent ¯rms.
Total pay reaches a maximum of around $7 million in 2000 when the majority of corporate
scandals occurred. The value of granted options in the total pay package reaches its
maximum in the same year. Firms seem to divert the most from granting options to
their CEOs in 2003 and 2004.
The middle panel covers ¯rms that are not present in the IRRC data but that are
available in the ExecuComp data. Except for 1998, the unmatched ¯rms pay less than
the matched ¯rms; these ¯rms also report lower net sales and return on assets but larger
volatilities compared to the volatilities of the matched sample. Furthermore, I investigate
whether or not the non-matched group is similar to the independent or dependent-board
¯rms in terms of pay and ¯rm performance. Over the whole period, the unmatched
¯rms seem to be signi¯cantly smaller than both the dependent- and independent-board
group of ¯rms; however, they are closer in size to the latter group than to the former.
In addition, the non-matched ¯rms are less pro¯table than both the independent and
dependent groups. Looking at CEO pay, the unmatched ¯rms seem to be similar to the
14independent-board ¯rms. Hence, the non-matched group of ¯rms may be characterized
as a separate set of ¯rms that are smaller and less pro¯table but exhibit pay levels similar
to that of the independent-board ¯rms.
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that the dependent-board ¯rms pay their managers
a greater amount than the independent-board ¯rms do. The di®erence of approximately
$2 million in annual pay in 2001 is the highest over the sample period. The main reason
for this pay di®erential is the particularly large option grants that the dependent-board
¯rms bestow on their CEOs. The value of options grants is calculated as the number of
options times the Black-Scholes option value,10 and it captures the e®ect of the size of
the option grants and any equity overvaluation.
Inspecting the value of a single option grant shows that the grants of dependent-board
¯rms are overvalued compared to the grants of independent-board ¯rms only before SOX;
after SOX this di®erential disappears. As for the size of the grant measured by the number
of shares as a fraction of a ¯rm's outstanding shares, the dependent-board ¯rms do not
give larger grants than the independent-board ¯rms, except in 2004 and 2005.
Another important tendency is that the dependent-board ¯rms exhibit larger levels
of sales than do the independent-board ¯rms, although for 1999-2001, the di®erence
is not statistically signi¯cant. The mean return on assets (ROA) indicates that the
dependent-board ¯rms perform better than the independent-board ¯rms only in 1998
and 2002. Comparing equity return volatilitiy across ¯rms shows that, except for the
most turbulent periods for the ¯nancial markets in 2001 and 2002, the independent-board
¯rms are less volatile than the dependent-board ¯rms.
10The most widely used method for valuing options is the Black-Scholes formula adjusted for con-
tinually paid dividends. The value of European call option paying dividends is: OptionV alue =
Pe¡ln(1+d)TN(z) ¡ Xe¡ln(1+r)N(z ¡ ¾
p
T), where P is the grant-date stock price, X is the exer-
cise price, T is the time remaining until expiration, d is the annualized dividend yield, ¾ is the
stock-price volatility, r is the risk-free discount rate, N(:) is the cumulative distribution function, and
z = (ln(P=X) + [ln(1 + r) ¡ ln(1 + d) + ¾2=2]T)=(¾
p
T):
154 Identi¯cation and Empirical Speci¯cation
The fall of Enron in 2001 is used as a motivating event for the corporate governance
reforms in 2002. The pre-reform period of analysis is from 1998 to 2001 and the post-
reform from 2003 to 2005. Year 2002 is dropped, since it is the year when the reform
was enacted. Although SOX is a complex regulation, this paper looks only at the im-
pact of improved board oversight through the requirement that boards be comprised of
a majority of independent directors. The level of board independence before SOX per-
mits the analysis of a more compliant group of ¯rms with strong board oversight and a
less compliant group of ¯rms with weak board oversight. The former group is de¯ned
as a \control" group and the latter as a \treatment" group. The di®erences in pay-
performance sensitivities between these two groups of ¯rms are more accurate measure
of the impact of SOX on CEO pay compared to only relying on before-after changes in
pay-performance sensitivities.
Previous studies using cross-sectional data to examine board monitoring and executive
pay rely on a potentially endogenous source of variation (Lehn et al., 2003). For example,
talented CEOs may in°uence the composition of company boards, equally plausible,
company boards may a®ect CEO pay. Using the act as a \surprising" event that causes
a forceful change in board structure might be a better identi¯cation of the relationship,
though to some degree, the extent of board change depends on the composition of the
board before the reform. I examine the pre-SOX change of the percentage of independent
directors to determine whether or not ¯rms expected the upcoming regulation and thus
adjusted their board policy before the passage of SOX. Considering independent- and
dependent-board ¯rms separately, the results show that there is no systematic di®erence
in the way board structure changes across ¯rms before 2002.
The share of independent directors has increased over the whole period from 1998 to
2005. To distinguish the trend e®ect from the potential e®ect of SOX, I estimate a pre-
liminary regression where a percent of independent directors is a left-hand-side variable,
and a linear trend and a dummy for the passage of the act are right-hand-side vari-
ables. The results show that the percentage of independent directors increases after 2002
even when accounting for the time trend (results are untabuilated). Although the trend
16towards more independence has started before SOX, the regulation itself contributes a
more signi¯cant increase.
Table 3 summarizes the changes in board independence after the passage of SOX
and con¯rms the actual reform's treatment. Each cell of the table reports the percent-
age change of the share of independent directors from before to after SOX across board
committees (rows) classi¯ed as independent or dependent (columns). Regardless of the
way an independent board committee is de¯ned, we observe that the reform a®ects ¯rms
with originally dependent boards to a greater extent than ¯rms with initially indepen-
dent boards. The table shows that the share of independent audit committee members
increases by 13% when using the median-portfolio-based approach and by 6% for the
majority-rule-based method. Overall, the percentage increase in the share of di®erent
types of independent directors is signi¯cantly higher (at the 1% level) in ¯rms with pre-
SOX dependent boards than in ¯rms with pre-SOX independent boards, which supports
the use of board independence as a proxy for changed monitoring environment.
A two-stage approach that allows for the simultaneous examination of the impact of
SOX on pay for luck and pay for performance is used. At the ¯rst stage, ¯rm performance
is decomposed into two parts: a systematic-risk component and a ¯rm-speci¯c compo-
nent. The systematic-risk component re°ects common industry shocks that a®ect all
¯rms in an industry. To be consistent with prior literature (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006), pay for luck is measured by the response of pay to
changes in industry-wide returns, and pay for skill (i.e., pay for performance) is measured
by the response of pay to changes in ¯rm-speci¯c performance. At the ¯rst stage, the
time series of each ¯rm's performance is decomposed as:
Returnjit = ¯1IndustryReturnjit + ³1t + ´1i + "1jit; (1)
where IndustryReturn is asset value weighted (or equal-weighted) industry return on
assets based on the two-digit SIC industry j in year t and ¯rm i itself is excluded from
the mean calculation,11 t is year ¯xed e®ects, ´1i is ¯rm ¯xed e®ects and "1jit is resid-
11A mechanical correlation arises if a ¯rm's return itself is included in the calculation of the average
industry return and then included in equation (1) to predict ¯rm performance.
17ual, which is the ¯rm-speci¯c component of ¯rm performance. The systematic compo-
nent, d Returnjit, is a product of the estimated coe±cient and the industry performance,
c ¯1IndustryReturnjit. At the second stage, the following regression is estimated:
Log(Payit) = [¯2 d Returnjit + ±2XXit + °µ1jit](1 + SOX) +
+ ½SOX + ³2t + ´2i + "2it; (2)
where SOX takes a value of one for the period 2003 to 2005 and zero for the period
1998 to 2001; Log(Payit) includes salary, bonus, bene¯ts, total value of restricted stock
granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts and all other
pay; d Returnjit is the systematic component common for the industry group and not
attributable to CEO actions or CEO quality; ¯2 is the response of pay to industry
performance that is associated with luck and Xit is a set of ¯rm-speci¯c variables such
as ¯rm size and stock return volatility; µ1jit = ´1i +"1jit; ´2i is ¯rm ¯xed e®ects and "2jit
is residual.
The above speci¯cation is estimated separately for dependent- and independent-board
¯rms. Following previous literature on CEO pay, time-invariant ¯rm heterogeneity is
accounted for by including ¯rm ¯xed e®ects.12 The standard errors are clustered at
the ¯rm level, allowing for correlation between di®erent observations within ¯rms across
di®erent years. The e®ect of the reform is captured separately by the post-SOX change
in pay for industry-induced (i.e., pay for luck) and pay for ¯rm-speci¯c return (i.e., pay
for performance) in dependent-board (treatment group) and independent-board ¯rms
(control group).
It is well known that the di®erence-in-di®erences estimator is based on strong identi-
¯cation assumptions.13 In particular, in the absence of treatment the average outcomes
for the treatment and control groups would have followed parallel paths over time. Com-
paring the annual total pay between the independent- and dependent-board ¯rms, the
12Murphy (1999) shows that controlling for ¯rm ¯xed e®ects is important in the managerial pay
literature.
13See Heckman and Hotz (1989) for an explanation of di®erence-in-di®erences, and Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (1998) for an application of this methodology to analyze the e®ect of anti-takeover legislation
on CEO pay in the US during the 1980s.
18value of option grants is the component that induces signi¯cant variation between the
pay levels in both groups of ¯rms. To reduce the existing disparity, I ¯rst consider pay
without options as a dependent variable in the main speci¯cation (Section 5) and pay
plus options' value is presented in Section 7 as a robustness check.
Garvey and Milbourn (2006) argue that the link between pay and industry perfor-
mance might re°ect compensation for taking systematic industry risk and not necessarily
re°ecting pay for luck. This argument assumes that managerial pay is symmetrically
linked both to good and bad industry fortune. However, if executives have managed to
capture the pay-setting process, their pay would be expected to be sensitive to industry
performance when the industry return (benchmark) is up but not when it is down. To
incorporate their argument in the current analysis, I estimate a model that allows for
the sensitivity of pay for luck and skill to vary with positive and negative values of luck
and skill. Particularly, the following terms (both with and without the SOX dummy) are
added to equation (2):
[» d Returnjit £ Down1 + Â"1jit £ Down2](1 + SOX); (3)
where Down1 takes on value one if d Returnjit < 0 and zero otherwise, and Down2 takes
on value one if "1jit < 0. If CEOs are expropriating by being asymmetrically paid for
luck, » is expected to be negative signi¯cant. In the SOX framework, » is expected to be
negative in dependent board ¯rms before SOX and decreasing afterwards.
5 Are CEOs Paid for Luck?
The empirical analysis begins by examining whether the average CEO is paid for changes
in ¯rm-speci¯c and/or industry-induced returns. To decompose ¯rm performance into
systematic and idiosyncratic components as speci¯ed in equation (1), I follow the method-
ology of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006). Because
I explore the impact of SOX, I allow for pre- and post-SOX changes in pay sensitivities
separately for dependent- and independent-board ¯rms. The estimates of total pay (op-
19tions excluded) regressions are reported in Table 4.14 This pay measure ignores changes
in the value of the CEO's existing shares and options. Whether the consequence of this
exclusion is an underestimation of the managerial incentives depends on the managers'
activities regarding their personal portfolios.15 Given the di±culty of controlling for
managers' activities, using current compensation has the advantage of measuring only
compensation components over which the board of directors has direct control. More-
over, the focus of this analysis is on the potential in°uence of SOX on executive pay,
rather than on the optimal managerial pay dynamics.
Since board decisions are the major channel through which SOX may a®ect CEO
current pay, I use pay levels instead of annual changes in pay. Another reason for using
the current level of CEO pay is that I study the impact of SOX on pay for luck, which does
not vary with °uctuations in previously granted pay. It is expected that SOX has limited
control over the amount of pay that CEOs choose to retain in their portfolios. The use
of current compensation is further justi¯ed by Core and Guay (1999), who conclude that
¯rms use °ow of equity incentives to reward past performance and re-optimize incentives
for future performance.
Table 4 presents the results from the second stage pay regressions which include the
estimated industry and ¯rm-speci¯c performances from equation (1). Columns 1 thought
3 of the table report the results for the full sample, independent- and dependent-board
¯rms. Column 1 shows that the coe±cient on industry-induced return is not signi¯cant.
On the contrary, ¯rm-speci¯c performance is linked positively to pay, which con¯rms that
the more skilful a manager is, the higher her or his pay will be. Columns 2 and 3 provide
a better understanding of the impact of SOX on pay structure because this speci¯cation
not only accounts for the passage of SOX but also, for di®erences between treatment and
control groups. The estimates presented in Column 2 include only independent-board
14Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a revised statement No.123 in December 2004
according to which all U.S. public ¯rms are now required to expense stock options for all ¯nancial
reporting periods that begin after June 15, 2005. To avoid the impact of these changes on CEO pay
levels, I examine pay without options in the main speci¯cation.
15Ofek and Yermack (2000) report evidence that managers alter their portfolios in response to the
composition of their pay packages. Similarly, managers counteract the e®ects of existing holdings through
hedging transactions.
20¯rms and con¯rm that these ¯rms, associated with strong governance, do not pay their
CEOs for changes in industry performance, either before or after the passage of SOX.
On the contrary, the dependent-board ¯rms reward managers for industry performance
before SOX, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1b. After the passage of SOX, however,
the dependent-board ¯rms seem to abandon this practice by decreasing the sensitivity
of pay to industry performance by 70%, which supports Hypothesis 2b. One standard
deviation increase in industry-induced return (0.045 units) corresponds to a 0.30% less
pay for industry-induced ROA for a dependent-board CEO after SOX than before SOX
.16
Next, concerning the estimates of ¯rm-speci¯c return, the results show that there are
no di®erences between the dependent- and independent-board ¯rms before SOX. The
post-SOX period, however, is associated with a notable 1.47 increase on a base of 0.93
in ¯rm-speci¯c performance estimate in the dependent-board ¯rms, while the sensitivity
remains unchanged for the independent-board ¯rms, which supports Hypothesis 2a and
2b.17 These results are consistent with those of Wang (2005), who studies the impact
of SOX on CFO pay. In particular, the author ¯nds that CFO incentive pay is reduced
after SOX in ¯rms with strong boards prior to the reform, while ¯rms with weak boards
increase their incentive compensation for CFOs after the reform.18
The overall impact of SOX on CEO pay for industry-induced performance is the
di®erence between the estimates of SOX*Industry-Induced ROA for dependent- and
independent-board ¯rms. The estimate of -6.59, with a p-value of 0.13, shows that
16A test for the equality of variance of industry returns before and after SOX is performed. The results
suggest that industry returns are more volatile after SOX. Another set of tests of equality of variances
of industry return separately before and after SOX between dependent- and independent-board ¯rms
indicates that industry returns for the independent-board ¯rms are more volatile than the industry
returns for the dependent-board ¯rms both before and after the passage of SOX.
17I also explore CEO pay in ¯rms present in the ExecuComp data but unavailable in the IRRC data.
These unmatched ¯rms exhibit CEO pay similar to the pay in the independent-board ¯rms, but both
groups of ¯rms di®er substantially in terms of ¯rm performance and size. Both samples, the unmatched
and the independent-board, are combined and the speci¯cation in equation 2 is re-estimated. The results
do not show any material change from the estimates reported in column 2. Thus, the lack of a complete
match does not seem to a®ect the conclusion of the main results.
18Wang (2005) estimates the sensitivity of pay to ¯rm-speci¯c return in a one-stage pay regression
where only a ¯rm's performance is controlled for. I estimate similar and the results con¯rm a substantial
increase in pay for performance in the dependent-board ¯rms after the passage of the act, while there is
no change evident for the independent-board ¯rms.
21the reform reduce the impact of industry return on pay. The other notable e®ect of SOX,
measured by the di®erences in pay for ¯rm-speci¯c performance between dependent- and
independent board ¯rms, is a relative increase in pay for skill by 1.37%. As a whole,
the reform seems to better link CEO pay to company performance and to reduce pay for
industry-induced return.
6 Evidence of Alternative Explanations
6.1 Asymmetric Benchmarking
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) interpret the response of pay to movements in industry
returns as pay for luck, i.e., pay for actions outside of CEO control. Garvey and Milbourn
(2006) argue that the positive sensitivity of pay to industry return might compensate for
bearing systematic risk instead of being pay-for-luck scenarios. Similar questions arise
in this paper's speci¯cation: whether the strong link between pay and industry return
in dependent-board ¯rms before SOX and its subsequent decrease after SOX is indeed
pay for luck. To further clarify the interpretation of this evidence, following Garvey
and Milbourn (2006), positive and negative industry changes are included in the pay
regressions. Under the pay-for-luck interpretation, CEO pay is expected to respond
less to industry performance during industry recessions than during times of industrial
boom. The results of this exercise are presented in columns 4 to 6 in Table 4, and Table
5 summarizes the total e®ects.
The speci¯cation in equation (3) allows for a complete interaction of industry-induced
return with its positive and negative values: Industry-Induced ROA*Down1, where Down1
is an indicator variable taking the value of one if Industry-Induced ROA is negative and
zero otherwise; Firm-Speci¯c ROA*Down2, where Down2 is taking value of one if ¯rm-
speci¯c ROA is negative, and zero otherwise; SOX*Industry-Induced ROA*Down1 and
SOX*Firm-Speci¯c ROA*Down2 account for the SOX-related changes in these sensi-
tivities. Table 5 summarizes the total sensitivities from this speci¯cation for depen-
dent and independent boards. For the full-sample speci¯cation, displayed in the upper
panel of the table, the sensitivity of total pay to industry-induced ROA before SOX is
22higher in booms than it is during recessions (Industry-Induced ROA+Industry-Induced
ROA*Down1); however, the link between industry-induced return and pay disappears
after SOX.19 Analyzing the group of independent-board ¯rms when industry return is
positive shows that pay is not linked to industry performance; however, the negative
sign in times of recession implies that systematic risk is ¯ltered out. The results for the
dependent-board ¯rms depict a di®erent picture. When downward industry returns are
observed, CEO pay decreases by 9.7% before SOX and by 5.14% after it (not signi¯cant).
In times of fortune, one percent increase in industry fortune leads to a 12.8% increase of
pay before SOX and only a 4.8% (not signi¯cant) increases after SOX. This asymmetry
of the pay-for-luck estimates for positive and negative industry returns before the pas-
sage of the reforms provides evidence that managers are paid for luck rather than being
compensated for bearing industry risk.
In the independent-board ¯rms the response of pay to ¯rm-speci¯c return remains
the same as for the pre-SOX period. The independent-board ¯rm results shown in Table
5 imply that CEOs are rewarded for skill in a similar way both before and after SOX. In
the dependent-board ¯rms, the estimates of pay for skill suggest a di®erent story. Before
the passage of SOX, CEOs are rewarded for skill without being punished for a lack of it.
After SOX, pay for skill increases signi¯cantly in these ¯rms, and CEOs are punished for
the lack of skill.
Overall, the results of the sensitivity of pay to industry-induced and ¯rm-speci¯c re-
turn suggest that companies with di®erent board structures pursue di®erent pay policies.
The results support the skimming view. CEOs of weakly governed ¯rms are rewarded for
industry performance when the industry is up, but they are punished to a lesser degree
when the industry is down. In addition, after the passage of SOX, there is no evidence
for such types of asymmetric benchmarking. Analysis of the robustness of this result to
two alternative explanations follows in subsections 6.2 and 6.3.
19Descriptive statistics of the performance benchmark show that industry-induced return, based on
the ¯rm's two-digit SIC code, is positive in 78% of all cases. This evidence is similar to the statistics
reported in Garvey and Milbourn (2006).
236.2 The Impact of Managerial Talent
Gopalan et al. (2007) provide an explanation as to why it might be optimal to compensate
managers for luck. Their model assumes that CEOs can a®ect industry performance by
implementing the ¯rm's strategy for exposure to industry factors. Since this strategy
is partially under the control of the CEO, incentives are all-important for ensuring an
optimal choice of the exposure level. Furthermore, the authors conclude that the optimal
contract rewards a risk-averse manager more for good luck than punishing him/her for
bad luck. The testable prediction of the model is that talented CEOs must be paid more
for luck than their less talented peers to motivate them to choose e±ciently the ¯rm's
exposure to industry °uctuations. Table 6 presents the results of pay for luck estimates
for talented and less talented CEOs, incorporating the SOX framework. Unlike in Table
4 where ¯rm speci¯c return is a regressor, in Table 6 each regression is is estimated
separately for positive and negative idiosyncratic return. Similarly to Gopalan et al.
(2007), a positive (negative) idiosyncratic return is used as an indicator for talent (no
talent). The lower part of the panel uses tenure as an alternative, yet somewhat cruder,
proxy for talent. As in Gopalan et al. (2007) and Milbourn (2003), the presumption
is that the longer CEOs manage to stay with a company, the more talented they are:
hence, they are in a position to make better strategic choices.20
Starting with the upper panel, the results suggest that pay for industry-induced return
is not sensitive to talent either before or after SOX. In the independent-board ¯rms before
SOX, it is precisely the less talented CEOs who seem to be rewarded most for industry-
induced return interpreted as pay for luck. The interpretation of the large positive pay for
luck for talented CEOs in dependent-board ¯rms is interesting in terms of the skimming
view. A talented CEO in a ¯rm with weak board oversight is expected to dominate the
pay-setting process more than less talented CEOs in similar ¯rms. There is approximately
a 60% decrease in pay for luck for talented CEOs only in dependent-board ¯rms after the
passage of SOX, which could imply that the reform manages to reduce pay for luck. The
results in the lower panel of Table 6 rea±rm that the talent hypothesis cannot explain
20Rajgopal et al. (2006) use ¯rm size to proxy for managerial talent. In Section 7 I check the sensitivity
of the results to ¯rm size.
24pay-for-luck changes. The results tend to support the view that, for the period 1998 to
2005, higher pay for luck for talented CEOs in dependent-board ¯rms is better explained
by the rent-extraction hypothesis than by the optimal incentives view.
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) consider that demand-supply dynamics in the man-
agerial labor market might explain higher pay in times of industry fortune when there is
a higher demand for skilled CEOs. The authors argue that the supply of highly skilled
CEOs is relatively inelastic; therefore, positive shocks to aggregate demand increase both
the value of the ¯rm as well as the marginal value of the CEO pay. In other words, the
link of pay to positive industry-wide return might be used to motivate a manager to
stay with the company when facing the opportunity to accept a better outside o®er. If
we believe that the link between CEO pay and industry-return °uctuations is driven by
demand-supply changes in the managerial labor market due to shocks, and particularly
during positive industry change, when talented CEOs are rewarded more for staying with
the company, then we would expect positive shocks to a®ect this link consistently over
time. On the contrary, we see that the average CEO is rewarded more for positive shocks
than for negative ones only before 2002; however, after the passage of SOX, positive
industry fortunes do not seem to be positively linked to CEO pay (See Table 5). This in-
consistency allows us to rule out the demand-supply argument, as quanti¯ed by industry
performance, when examining the before/after change of pay for industry performance
among ¯rms with di®erent governance structures.
6.3 Market Concentration
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) suggest that pay for industry-induced return is a®ected
by strategic interactions among ¯rms in imperfectly competitive markets. In particular,
managers operating in less competitive industries are expected to be exposed to a lower
sensitivity of pay to industry return to discourage them from competing too aggressively.
This lower sensitivity of pay for industry-induced return implies that executives will
receive lower compensation if executives of other ¯rms in the industry deliver lower return
to their shareholders. Thus according to this model, in highly concentrated industries
where oligopolistic structures are present, lower pay for industry performance is expected
25to weaken competition. To empirically address this explanation, I investigate whether
pay for industry-induced return varies with the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index, which is
the sum of the industry's (two-digit SIC) squared market shares in percentages. By
construction, an increase in the index indicates greater market concentration. Likewise,
a small Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index is indicative of a competitive market.
I follow the speci¯cation of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b), where industry-induced
return and ¯rm-speci¯c return are interacted with the cumulative distribution function of
the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index, which is calculated over the ¯ve years prior to the event
year. If it were optimal to soften product market competition, the interaction term of
industry-induced return and the index would assume a negative coe±cient. The results
are presented in Table 7. The ¯rst three columns of the table present a speci¯cation where
industry-induced ROA is interacted with the industry concentration index without allow-
ing for before- or after-SOX changes. Focusing on the coe±cients on Industry-Induced
ROA*Her.Percentile, we see a signi¯cant increase in pay for industry-induced return
with increase of industry concentration. When examining separately the independent-
and dependent-board ¯rms a large part of this sensitivity originates from the dependent
board ¯rms, although it is not statistically signi¯cant. The sign of the coe±cient is oppo-
site to the one predicted by the model of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b), and therefore
does not support the view that product market competition reduces the sensitivity of
pay to industry return.
In an alternative speci¯cation, I interact the SOX dummy with the industry-induced
and ¯rm-speci¯c returns. The estimates in columns 4 to 6 indicate that pay for industry
return decreases signi¯cantly for highly concentrated industries after SOX only for the
dependent board ¯rms. Hence, the results are not consistent with the market competition
explanation of pay for industry-induced return.
7 Robustness Tests
The results thus far strongly support the conclusion that CEOs managing companies
with dependent-board ¯rms were paid for luck, while CEOs in independent-board ¯rms
26did not manage to capture the pay-setting process and set their own pay before SOX.
This section tackles several possible concerns with the baseline results.
i) Table 8 shows estimates from a speci¯cation in which the dependent variable is
total pay instead of total pay without options presented in Table 4. Option grants
constitute a larger part of pay in dependent-board ¯rms than in independent-board ¯rms
only before SOX. When adding the value of granted options to the rest of CEO pay,
the results di®er slightly from the estimates in Table 4. The coe±cient on industry-
return, -4.393 (p<10%), suggests that industry risk is ¯ltered out in independent-board
¯rms before SOX. This evidence is consistent with the agency theory prediction that
the industry component of a ¯rm's returns is removed from the compensation package
since a CEO cannot a®ect the market, and it is costly for executives to bear the related
risks. After SOX, however, there is a notable increase in the link between CEO pay and
industry return. As for the dependent-board ¯rms, the results con¯rm a strong sensitivity
between CEO pay and industry return before SOX and a sharp decline after it. Table 9
reports the estimates of pay for luck when industry returns are positive and when they
are negative. The independent-board ¯rms are ¯ltering out the e®ect of negative industry
return before SOX. The dependent-board ¯rms follow a di®erent policy: during industry
fortunes, CEOs are rewarded, but during slowdowns they are punished, however, to a
smaller extent.
ii) Let's now suppose that ¯rm performance is measured by stock return instead of
return on assets. Return on assets is closely related to short-term accounting pro¯t,
and it directly re°ects managerial decisions and a ¯rm's interaction with the product
market. As a frequently used measure of performance, stock return incorporates a ¯rm's
expected pro¯tability, which might be independent of the evaluation of current perfor-
mance and the e®ort of the current manager. As an accounting measure, ROA is more
easily manipulated than stock return measures. Due to the substantially higher number
of restatements as a result of improved internal control systems after 2002, it is possible
that ROA is subject to substantial accounting corrections (Coates, 2007). Stock return
is used as an alternative measure of performance because it has remained una®ected by
accounting procedures. Similar to previous evidence (Kaplan, 1994), the results from Ta-
27ble 8 show that a percentage change in compensation is more strongly related to changes
in return on assets than to changes in stock returns. The conclusion from the main
speci¯cation in Table 4, however, is preserved|¯rms with dependent boards link their
CEO pay to market-wide movements in performance that are beyond the control of the
executives before SOX; however, they abandon this practice afterwards. The impact of
industry-induced stock return on total pay con¯rms a decrease in the sensitivity of pay to
industry-wide movements in performance in the dependent-board ¯rms only after SOX.
The independent-board ¯rms, viewed as better governed ¯rms, do not pay their man-
agers for changes in industry-related stock performance. Looking at the pay for ¯rm-
speci¯c return, dependent-board ¯rms reward managers for ¯rm-speci¯c return, i.e., skill,
only after SOX, while the independent-board ¯rms do not change their pre-SOX policy of
rewarding skill. When accounting for asymmetric response of pay to market performance,
the results are very similar to those in Table 5.
iii) Whether pay for luck varies with ¯rm size is also tested. Table 10 reports results
separately for small and large ¯rms. Small ¯rms are de¯ned as those with lower sales
than the median sales level. The results remain unchanged for the large and small ¯rms.
Earlier work shows that talented CEOs manage large ¯rms because doing so maximizes
their impact and economic e±ciency (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). In addition to the
measures of talent used in Section 6, I look at ¯rm size as a proxy for talent|large
¯rms attract more talented CEOs. The results clearly indicate that there is no di®erence
in pay for luck for large and small ¯rms across board type, thus excluding the role of
talent in explaining the before/after changes of pay for luck between dependent and
independent-board ¯rms.
iv) Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) show that ignoring the impact of stock volatility
on CEO pay might signi¯cantly understate the strength of the pay-performance relation-
ship. The cumulative distribution function of stock volatility, measured as the standard
deviation of stock returns using the ¯ve years of monthly data preceding the data year,
captures both size e®ects and risk e®ects. Similar to the result in Garvey and Milbourn
(2006), Table 11 shows that on average the sensitivity of pay to industry-wide return is
decreasing as the risk increases for the period 1998-2005. However, the main result of
28pay for luck across various board structures before and after SOX remains unchanged.
These results are preserved also when accounting for positive and negative industry-return
changes in Table 12.
v) I assess the sensitivity of the results to the measure of board independence. In Table
13, board independence is based on a majority rule, according to which companies with
more than 50% independent directors are classi¯ed as independent. The total number of
this type of company is 358. The results do not show any material di®erence from the
estimates in Table 4. The estimates in Table 14 suggest that the same pattern of pay for
luck changes when industry returns are positive and negative, as shown in the results in
Table 5.
vi) The speci¯cation in equation (2) follows Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) who
consider contemporaneous industry-induced and ¯rm-speci¯c returns to explain varia-
tions in CEO pay. This speci¯cation is appealing for the present before/after comparison
of the impact of SOX using ¯rm ¯xed e®ects in which deviations from sample means
are estimated. However, pay might respond to lagged industry-induced and lagged ¯rm-
speci¯c return, because some components of pay, such as salary, are set at the beginning
of the year, while others, such as bonuses, are determined at the end of the year. Table 15
shows that when including lagged industry-induced and ¯rm-speci¯c returns, the sensi-
tivity of pay to industry return decreases signi¯cantly after SOX, compared to the levels
from the pre-SOX period in dependent-board ¯rms. The e®ect of lagged industry-induced
and ¯rm-speci¯c return is insigni¯cant. This evidence further supports the conclusion
from the base speci¯cation in Table 4.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the change in executive pay before and after the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, NYSE and NASDAQ regulations of 2002. Introduced soon after
a series of corporate scandals, the reforms mandated independent audit, nomination,
and compensation committee. Employing a di®erence-in-di®erences methodology, this
paper explores the e®ect of these reforms on CEO pay for performance and pay for luck.
29The pre- and post-SOX di®erences are compared across two types of ¯rms: those with
stronger board monitoring before the reform and those with weaker board monitoring
with respect to the percentage of independent directors. The pay-for-performance link
was found to increase in ¯rms with weaker board oversight (¯rms more a®ected by SOX
stipulations) after 2002. In contrast, the pay-for-performance relationship changed little
in ¯rms with independent boards.
The results further show that pay for luck disappears in dependent board ¯rms after
SOX. Overall, the results are found to be robust to several alternative explanations:
asymmetric benchmarking, CEO talent and the degree of industry concentration.
Unlike Wang (2005), who focuses on SOX and pay for performance of speci¯c execu-
tive groups (CFOs and COOs), this study examines CEO pay for performance and pay
for luck, thereby contributing to the contemporary literature on CEO pay. The results
also con¯rm earlier ¯ndings of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) that stronger corpo-
rate governance decreases pay for luck associated with the ine±cient transfer of wealth
from executives to shareholders. Finally, this analysis contributes to the literature by
employing a superior approach for identifying the e®ect of the recent governance reforms
of 2002 on CEO pay for luck.
The policy implications of this paper suggest that stricter corporate governance rules,
ensured by SOX, can be bene¯cial for shareholders. Reduced pay for luck can help to
improve agency problems between CEOs and shareholders. To evaluate the total e®ect
of the corporate governance reforms of 2002, however, it is necessary to account for the
costs of SOX (e.g., increased audit fees), which is left for future research.
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37Table 5: Asymmetric Pay for Industry-Induced and Firm-Speci¯c Return
Coe±cients come from Table 4, columns (4)-(6). They present total before- and after-SOX e®ect for
positive/negative Industry-Induced and Firm-Speci¯c ROA. Good (Bad) Luck indicates positive (nega-
tive) Industry-Induced ROA. Good (Bad) Skill indicates positive (negative) Firm-Speci¯c ROA. SOX is
an indicator variable taking on the value of one for the 2003-2005 period and zero otherwise. Industry-
Induced ROA is the predicted company return from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1),
in which ¯rm performance is regressed on industry return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's
2-digit SIC industry, where the ¯rm itself is excluded from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA
is the residual from the same regression. Down1 takes on the value of one if Industry-Induced ROA is
negative. Down2 takes on the value of one if Firm-Speci¯c ROA is negative. *** Signi¯cant at the 1%
level; ** Signi¯cant at 5%; * Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ¯rm level.
Good Luck Bad Luck Good Skill Bad Skill
Down1 = 0 Down1 = 1 Down2 = 0 Down2 = 1
Panel A: Full Sample
Before SOX 3.53 -1.04 1.8*** 0.58*
[2.345] [3.07] [0.34] [0.33]
After SOX 1.4 0.11 2.27*** 1.44***
[2.13] [2.64] [0.49] [0.35]
Panel B: Independent
Before SOX 0.075 -5.04 1.54*** 1.07***
[2.484] [3.57] [0.44] [0.39]
After SOX -0.55 -2.53 1.62*** 1.13**
[2.67] [3.26] [0.57] [0.45]
Panel C: Dependent
Before SOX 12.83*** 9.65** 2.21*** -0.03
[3.645] [3.98] [0.53] [0.52]
After SOX 4.81 5.14 3.08*** 1.89***
[3.19] [3.94] [0.88] [0.55]
38Table 6: CEO Talent: Pay for Industry-Induced Return Before- and After-
SOX
Second-stage ordinary least squares regressions of CEO pay on Industry-Induced and Firm-Speci¯c ROA,
as in Table 4, columns (1)-(3). The dependent variable is the log of CEO total pay, which comprises
of salary, bonus, other annual pay, total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentives and
all other pay. Each column comes from a separate regression. Coe±cients on Industry-Induced ROA
separately before- and after-SOX are reported. Industry-Induced ROA is the predicted company return
from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1) in which ¯rm performance is regressed on industry
return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's 2-digit SIC industry, where the ¯rm itself is excluded
from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA is the residual from the same regression. SOX is an
indicator variable taking on the value of one for 2003-2005 period and zero otherwise. In Panel A, Talent
(No Talent) is measured by positive (negative) Firm-Speci¯c ROA. In Panel B, Talent (No Talent) is
measured as being higher (lower) than the median CEO tenure values. *** Signi¯cant at the 1% level;
** Signi¯cant at 5%; * Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ¯rm level.
Full Independent Dependent
Talent No Talent Talent No Talent Talent No Talent
Panel A: Firm-Speci¯c Return
Before SOX 1.62 5.61 -4.27 7.12** 16.34*** 2.03
[2.90] [2.81] [3.01] [2.99] [4.61] [6.33]
After SOX 2.46 1.497 -0.77 1.82 6.57* 1.15
[2.76] [2.84] [3.42] [3.40] [3.87] [5.36]
Panel B: CEO Tenure
Before SOX 8.10** 4.75* 3.81 4.49* 21.07*** 5.65
[3.39] [2.84] [3.07] [2.64] [7.20] [5.96]
After SOX 2.10 2.33 2.39 0.57 2.04 8.13















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table 11: Robustness to Stock Volatility
Second-stage ordinary least squares regressions of CEO pay on Industry-Induced, Firm-Speci¯c ROA and
stock volatility. The dependent variable is the log of CEO total pay, which comprises of salary, bonus,
other annual pay, total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentives and all other pay. SOX is
an indicator variable taking on the value of one for the 2003-2005 period and zero otherwise. ROA is net
income before extraordinary items and discounted operations divided by total assets. Industry-Induced
ROA is the predicted company return from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1) in which
¯rm performance is regressed on industry return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's 2-digit SIC
industry, where the ¯rm itself is excluded from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA is the residual
from the same regression. Cdf Volatility indicates the cdf of stock volatility computed over ¯ve years of
monthly data preceding the data year. Each regression includes sales, year ¯xed e®ects, ¯rm ¯xed e®ects,
and a complete set of interaction terms (untabulated). *** Signi¯cant at the 1% level; ** Signi¯cant at
5%; * Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ¯rm level. Board independence is
based on sale deciles portfolios.
Full Independent Dependent
Industry-Induced ROA 3.978* 0.354 13.215***
[2.333] [2.487] [4.056]
Firm-Speci¯c ROA 3.187*** 2.986*** 3.448***
[0.535] [0.628] [0.955]
Cdf Volatility 0.097 0.094 0.089
[0.093] [0.119] [0.150]
SOX* Industry-Induced ROA -1.381 0.089 -7.044
[2.465] [2.906] [4.456]
SOX* Firm-Speci¯c ROA -0.279 -1.433 1.608
[1.071] [1.285] [1.725]
SOX*Cdf Volatility -0.163** -0.155** -0.187
[0.066] [0.078] [0.116]
Industry-Induced ROA*Cdf Volatility -2.869** -2.207 -3.803*
[1.228] [1.472] [2.092]
Firm-Speci¯c ROA*Cdf Volatility -3.002*** -2.477*** -3.648***
[0.739] [0.842] [1.319]
SOX*Industry-Induced ROA*Cdf Volatility 1.39 0.515 2.725
[1.139] [1.514] [1.722]
SOX*Firm-Speci¯c ROA*Cdf Volatility 1.412 2.194 -0.123
[1.586] [2.286]
44Table 12: Robustness to Stock Volatility: Asymmetric Benchmarking
Coe±cients come from Table 11. They present the total before/after e®ect for positive/negative Industry-
Induced and Firm-Speci¯c Return. Before SOX covers the 1998-2001 period, After SOX covers 2003-
2005. Good (Bad) Luck indicates positive (negative) Industry-Induced Return. Industry-Induced ROA
is the predicted company return from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1) in which ¯rm
performance is regressed on industry return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's 2-digit SIC
industry, where the ¯rm itself is excluded from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA is the residual
from the same regression. Good (Bad) Skill indicates positive (negative) Firm-Speci¯c Return. Each
regression includes sales, year ¯xed e®ect, ¯rm ¯xed e®ects, and a complete set of interaction terms.
*** Signi¯cant at the 1% level; ** Signi¯cant at 5%; * Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the ¯rm level. Board independence is based on sale deciles portfolios.
Good Luck Bad Luck Good Skill Bad Skill
Down1=0 Down1=1 Down2=0 Down2=1
Panel A: Full Sample
Before 2.88 -2.14 1.94*** -1.07*
[2.34] [3.49] [0.57] [0.55]
After 2.12 -4.47 6.27 0.86*
[2.3] [2.99] [3.89] [0.5]
Panel B: Independent Boards
Independent
Before 0.22 -5.52 1.36* -0.54
[2.64] [4.22] [0.71] [0.69]
After 0.28 -6.26 2.72 0.87
[3.02] [3.8] [4.61] [0.59]
Panel C: Dependent Boards
Before 10.13** 6.97 2.77 -2.16**
[3.91] [4.93] [0.93] [0.75]
After 4.93 -0.63 12.47* 0.90
[3.33] [4.56] [6.84] [0.88]
45Table 13: Robustness to Board Independence
Second-stage ordinary least squares regressions of CEO pay on Industry-Induced and Firm-Speci¯c ROA.
Board independence is based on the presence of a majority of independent directors (50%). The depen-
dent variable is the log of CEO total pay, which comprises of salary, bonus, other annual pay, total value
of restricted stock granted, long-term incentives and all other pay. SOX is an indicator variable taking
on the value of one for the 2003-2005 period and zero otherwise. ROA is net income before extraordinary
items and discounted operation divided by total assets. Industry-Induced ROA is the predicted company
return from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1), in which ¯rm performance is regressed on
industry return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's 2-digit SIC industry, where the ¯rm itself
is excluded from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA is the residual from the same regression.
Each regression includes sales, year ¯xed e®ects, ¯rm ¯xed e®ects and a complete set of interaction
terms (untabulated). *** Signi¯cant at the 1% level; ** Signi¯cant at 5%; * Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Full Independent Dependent
Industry-Induced ROA 2.89 2.18 12.58***
[2.297] [2.514] [4.345]
Firm-Speci¯c ROA 1.10*** 1.043*** 0.638
[0.172] [0.161] [0.429]
SOX*Industry-Induced ROA -1.505 1.307 -9.69**
[2.426] [2.670] [4.754]
SOX*Firm-Speci¯c ROA 0.694** 0.378 1.501**
[0.296] [0.266] [0.703]
Table 14: Robustness to Board Independence: Asymmetric Benchmarking
Coe±cients come from Table 13. They present the total before/after-SOX e®ect for positive/negative
Industry-Induced and Firm-Speci¯c Return. Industry-Induced ROA is the predicted company return
from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1), in which ¯rm performance is regressed on industry
return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's 2-digit SIC industry, where the ¯rm itself is excluded
from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA is the residual from the same regression. Before SOX
covers the 1998-2001 period, After SOX covers the 2003-2005 period. Good (Bad) Luck indicates positive
(negative) Industry-Induced Return. Good (Bad) Skill indicates positive (negative) Firm-Speci¯c Return.
Each regression includes sales, year ¯xed e®ects, ¯rm ¯xed e®ects, and a complete set of interaction
terms. Independence is based on majority rule. *** Signi¯cant at the 1% level; ** Signi¯cant at 5%; *
Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ¯rm level.
Good Luck Bad Luck Good Skill Bad Skill
Down1=0 Down1=1 Down2=0 Down2=1
Panel A: Independent Boards
Before SOX 2.99 -3.52 1.67*** 0.65**
[2.51] [2.96] [0.32] [0.3]
After SOX 3.83 0.11 1.89*** 1.09***
[2.29] [2.59] [0.44] [0.31]
Panel B: Dependent Boards
Before SOX 12.91*** 15.94*** 1.76* -0.189
[4.45] [5.16] [0.81] [0.824]
After SOX 2.48 7.22 2.14* 2.12***
[3.89] [5.76] [1.19] [0.75]
46Table 15: Robustness to Lagged Performance
Second-stage ordinary least squares regressions of CEO pay on Industry-Induced, Firm-Speci¯c ROA and
their lagged values. The dependent variable is the log of CEO total pay, which comprises of salary, bonus,
other annual pay, total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentives and all other pay. SOX
is an indicator variable taking on the value of one for the 2003-2005 period and zero otherwise. ROA
is net income before extraordinary items and discounted operations divided by total assets. Industry-
Induced ROA is the predicted company return from a ¯rst-stage regression, speci¯ed in equation (1),
in which ¯rm performance is regressed on industry return (asset-weighted industry ROA in the ¯rm's
2-digit SIC industry, where the ¯rm itself is excluded from the mean calculation). Firm-Speci¯c ROA is
the residual from the same regression. Each regression includes sales, year ¯xed e®ect, ¯rm ¯xed e®ects
and a complete set of interaction terms (untabulated). *** Signi¯cant at the 1% level; ** Signi¯cant at
5%; * Signi¯cant at 10%. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ¯rm level. Board independence is
based on sales deciles portfolios.
Full Independent Dependent
Industry-Induced ROA 1.530*** 0.29 3.870***
[0.487] [0.643] [0.746]
Industry-Induced ROA(lagged) 0.658 0.8 0.347
[0.628] [0.817] [0.973]
Firm-Speci¯c ROA 0.552*** 0.601*** 0.518***
[0.123] [0.211] [0.185]
Firm-Speci¯c ROA(lagged) -0.033 -0.229 0.244
[0.134] [0.193] [0.197]
SOX*Industry-Induced ROA -0.641 0.499 -1.827***
[0.899] [1.239] [0.9]
SOX*Industry-Induced ROA(lagged) -0.741 -1.219 -0.039
[0.934] [1.303] [1.395]
SOX*Firm-Speci¯c ROA 0.731*** 0.334 1.297***
[0.225] [0.381] [0.340]
SOX*Firm-Speci¯c ROA(lag) -0.058 -0.075 -0.053
[0.223] [0.310] [0.329]
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